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lo GENERALIZATIONS 
Introduetion 
10 The fundamental changes in the functions of governments in low-
income countries and the changing environments in which they must work have 
ennanced the awareness of the need fcr administrative reform. Achievement 
of independence, sometimes followed by the replacement of inefficient inde-
pendent governments by reform-oriented ones, the introduction of national 
planning for development, and enlargement of the scope of government to meet 
the mounting aspirations of peoples for more education, health facilities 
and the public services, as well as higher incomes, require far-reaching 
1/ 
changes in public administrative systems to meet the new challenges„ — 
2. In most of the ex-colonial countries, the main task is to re-orient 
administrative structures and procedures designed in a static era for the 
provision of routine government services to the requirements of a dynamic era 
concerned with development. This is a complex and difficult job. But the 
task is even more complicated in low-income countries which have been 
politically independent for a long time. These countries have frequently 
failed to build up efficient government administrations, even for the collec-
tion of taxes, the preservation of law and order or the provision of basic 
services. In these countries, therefore, administrative structures must not-
only be modernized to meet the new needs of political, social and economic 
development! they must also be made to function with tolerable efficiency to 
1/ "The United Nations Programme in Public Administration" Report by the 
Secretariat. Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Programme in Public 
Administration. 16-2Ü January 1967* ST/SG/ACe 6/L. 3. 12 December 1966, p. J 
provide the usual government services. — 
The Tendency Toward Major Reform 
3. Given the magnitude and scope of the public administration problem 
in low-income countries, there is an understandable tendency on the part of 
those aware of the needs to address themselves to major administrative 
reforms i.e., "towards a general improvement of public administration, or 
at least a strategic part of it, such as the Civil Service system, which 
may, in turn, become a source of stimulus for further reform throughout the 
2/ 
system. — Thus, in a Report to the Government of Malaysia in 1966, 
Professors John D. Montgomery of Harvard University and Milton J. Esroan of 
the University of Pittsburgh recommended the creation of a Development 
Administration Unit in the Prime Minister's Department, which has since 
been established, to plan and guide major, government-wide, programs or 
administrative improvement in such areas as personnel and career development, 
budgeting and expenditure control, procurement, and contracting. In another 
(as yet unpublished) report prepared by Dr. John C. Honey of the Institute 
: ! 
of Public Administration, a proposal is made for the creation of a National 
Council on the Public Service in Latin American countries which would act as 
the spearhead for improving each country's public service and administra-
tion. ¥ 
— — — — — . ! 
1/ Waterston, Albert. Development Planning: Lessons of Experience. Johns 
~~ Hopkins Press (1965). Baltimore, Maryland, pp. 250-251. 
2/ U.N. ST/3)/AC-6/L.3, op# cit., p. 37. 
3/ "Toward Strategies Fqr Public Administration Development in Latin 
America". 
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L'.a Such bodies might be able to perform useful service under appro-
priate conditionss but only when they are consistently and firmly supported 
by the political authority,, This appears to be the situation in Malaysia, 
where the new Development Administration Unit is being sponsored by the 
Dsputy Prime Minister of the country» For awhile, Venezuela's Public Service 
Commission, established to improve that country's public administration, 
enjoyed considerable prestige because of the support it received from the 
President of Venezuela. But with the passage of time, the Commission lost 
its former prestige and influence«. Experience shows that the establishment 
of a new agency, however well conceived, frequently brings little or no 
improvement in the public administration because it proves not to be immune 
from the malaise which afflicts the rest of the body politic„ 
5« This is hardly surprising to anyone familiar with the history of 
attempts to initiate overall administrative reforms in low-income countries 
throughout the world. India, Pakistan, Iran and the Philippines in Asiaj 
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador> Brazil, Argentina and Chile in Latin America; 
Ethiopia, Ghana and Libya in Africa; to name only examples, have for many 
years sought to improve the efficiency of their public services with only 
modest results to show for their efforts. ' Proposals for global administra-
tive reforms, which in the abstract appeared desirable and reasonable, have 
frequently ended up as distorted, piece-meal solutions after implementation 
which bore little resemblance to what was originally intended. Or, where 
implementation of an advanced program of administrative reform was actually 
carried out in more or less the intended fashion, as in the case of the 
- u -
performance budgeting system introduced in the Philippines with \the help of 
t 
foreign technical assistance, it proved to be beyond the absorptive capacity 
of a public service firmly committed to traditional procedures. 
6. One can only agree with the conclusion of the Public Administration 
Branch of the United Nations Secretariat, made after a review of the U.N. 
projects related to major administrative reform that "Administrative improve-
ment is a long-range and difficult process". Nor can there be ¿any.quarrel 
concerning the accuracy of the Branch's contention "that far-reaching changes 
of a fundamental nature are essential in political and social spheres .as the 
first step in administrative reform". 
7. Thus, a question arises whether the trouble with most effort? ±q 
improve public administration has not been that too much has been attempted 
at once« Given the right political and social environment, comprehensive 
efforts at administrative reform can undoubtedly succeed "if pursued con-
sistently and with full realization of the complexity of the task and the 
2/ 
nature and magnitude of the resources required."—' 
Inadequacy of the "Vlholistic" Approach 
8. But what is the appropriate strategy when "the right political and 
social environment" does not exist and where governments are unwilling, or 
as is more likely, unable to make the far-reaching and fundamental changes 
which the U.N. correctly considers to be the first step in major administra-
tive reform? Is the prescription still to be "wholistic", as KLeber 
y U»N. ST/SG/AC.6/L.3, op. cit., p. b$. 
2/ Ibid. 
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Nascimento of Brazil has called attempts at administrative reform in his 
country, rather than partial; -^sudden rather than gradual; general rather 
than specific? Is it sensible to continue with this approach although little 
has been accomplished by it in the past and there is no valid reason for 
believing that the "right political and social environment" is closer to 
realization in most low-income countries? 
9» Anyone with experience in low-income countries in early stages of 
development soon comes to know that attempts at fundamental, across-the-
board reform to create ideal systems in any field of activity are likely to 
be premature and self-defeating» The necessary pre-conditions for the 
success of such efforts, however justifiable in terms of need or desire to 
do the right thing, simply do not exist® Professor Albert Hirschman has 
called this approach "the motivation-outruns-understanding style of problem-
solving", characterized by "endlessly repeated calls for a full,integrated, 
definitive, and rapid solution to the difficulties that are being 
2/ 
encountered". — 
10. On the other hand, the evidence shows that partial administrative 
reform, or at least improvement, is feasible in selected instances - be it 
in connection with projects, programs, economic or social sectors, or geo-
graphic areas or whole regions - where the required preconditions for success-
ful comprehensive reform do not 
1/ Cited in Bell, Peter D., "Public Administration Development in Brazil" 
~ (1966). Unpublished. 
y Xbido ' ; 
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exist. Where the need to get something important done arouses in political 
or other authorities an awareness that administrative change is essential to 
the success of the venture, where the venture is backed by a powerful person, 
group or entity which is likely to stay powerful and interested long enough 
to allow reforms to be institutionalized, and where the proposed reforms are 
not beyond the capacity of the governmental unit(s) concerned,, the prospects 
for administrative reform are good. These prerequisites to reform, .way of 
course exist in some less developed countries in some periods in sufficient 
strength to permit global reforms to be instituted; but if experience counts 
it would be much more realistic to assume that in most low-income countries, 
the lack or insufficiency of one or more of the preconditions dooms most 
attempts at global reform. It is not defeatism, therefore, but prudence, 
nurtured by experience, that counsels the necessity for the; courage and:, 
patience to think small. 
11. For most less developed countries, the comprehensive approach to 
administrative reform may not be so much wrong as it is premature., Partial 
administrative change may not be as neat and satisfying as a global over-
haul of the civil service or a fundamental revision of a major segment of 
i 
public administration, like the budget or procurement, but the choice between 
global and partial reform may not be a real one. Albert Hirschman effec-
tively demolished the theory of balanced growth by pointing out, among other 
things, that it required huge amounts of precisely those attributes -
entrepreneurship, the ability to make decisions and managerial skills -
which are in very limited supply in. less developed countries. It was 
altogether inconceivable, he pointed out, that a less developed country 
= 7 -
could with its own forces, or even with limited, help from abroad, mount the 
kind of balanced, comprehensive investment program envisioned by protagon-
ists of the balanced growth theory« Indeed, said Hirschman, if a country 
were able to apply the doctrine of balanced growth, it would not be an 
underdeveloped country» Hirschman went on to elaborate his theory of un-
balanced growth and showed that not only has growth moved in see=saw 
fashion over the years in the now developed countries, but that the dis-
equilibrium created by one investment induced a second disequilibrium which 
induced a second investment, and so on» 
120 Similar arguments can be marshalled against the view that overall 
administrative reform is preferable to partial reform. The many failures 
of attempts at global administrative reform have made it clear that the 
governments of most less developed countries are not equipped with the 
managerial skills and decision-making powers, or for that matter, with the 
political stability and commitment required, to effectively carry out global 
administrative reforms. If the evidence accumulated thus far liere to be 
examined objectively and dispassionately, it probably would show that in 
most less developed countries, most administrative changes (whether proposed 
originally as global or partial reforms) have really been piece-meal in 
nature» If effective, they may well have served as models in other parts 
of government; if ineffective, they may well have made it clear that further 
reform is required. In either case, partial reforms may have induced 
further reforms and have prepared the way for a more fundamental,across-
the-board, advance® This is not hypothetical» It describes what has 
happened in some countries. It would not be surprising if research showed 
- 8 -• 
that it has happened in many or most low-income countries. 
The Case for Partial Administrative Reform 
13. Even if it could be shown that ineffectual global administrative 
changes eventually stimulatedbroader reforms than might otherwise have beer, 
possible, it would not constitute an adequate defense of such change. There 
is a school of thought which holds that things must get worse before they car;-
get better in some low-income countries« But this is not the: point: of. view 
espoused: here. The situation is bad enough as it is in many of these 
countries for a planned approach at unbalancing it further. Rather,, the. 
view advanced here is that partial, improvements in public administration 
need not be haphazard, piece-meal and ineffectual^ if carefully conceived 
and planned, they can produce substantial immediate results in.dealing with 
urgent problems and, in-addition, lay a basis for overall', administrative -
reform later. 
liu It has been shown, for example, that in countries where1 drastic, 
across-the-board: changes in personnel practices, administrative; procedures 
and organization on an "all or nothing" basis were unfeasible, important 
administrative, improvements were nevertheless possible if. they were related 
to the need to carry out important development projects and programs. —^ 
It would be desirable in all cases to relate such "nuclei" of reform to a 
comprehensive program for improving public administration. But where this 
is not practicable^ and it is contended here that it is. in fact impracticable 
in many low-income countries at the ir present stage of development, the 
1/ Waterstjon, Albert. Development Planning; Lessons of Experience, 
op. cit., p. 285. 
"nuclei" approach may constitute a feasible alternative« 
l$e This is not to say that attempts should not be made whenever 
appropriate to introduce overall reforms based on comprehensive programs 
for major improvements in public administration,, Indeed, it is probable 
that in some countries, the "nuclei" and the comprehensive approaches can 
constitute two components in a coordinated approach to administrative 
betterment,, But whereas the comprehensive approach may prove to be feasible 
in some countries where conditions are propitious, the "nuclei" approach is 
likely to be applicable in all- Moreover, whenever "nuclei" of administra-
tive improvement had been established, efforts at eventual global reform 
would surely be aided. 
16. Public administration covers every aspect of government activity. 
It is inextricably interwoven in the warp and woof of the fabric of govern-
ment. But just as it is impossible to envisage a substantive task of the 
state whose execution does not involve the administrative apparatus in some 
way, it is impossible to conceive of public administration as something 
which is in fact separated, or apart from, the substance of government. It 
is true, of course, that principles of public administration may be treated 
as a separate subject. But this is an abstraction from reality, defensible 
under some circumstances as a pedagogical device» It must never be confused 
with the reality itself. 
17o Hence, neither public administration nor administrative reform 
should be an end in itself. Improved public administration may be a neces-
sary condition for bettering government services, but it is not a sufficient 
one. For example, a major reform like the installation of the modern system 
- 10 -• 
of performance budgeting in the Philippines may have set the stage for 
improvements in government services at some later time, but it has had 
little impact on government procedures thus far. For the time being, it 
is a costly innovation because it employed resources that might have been 
put to more immediately remunerative use elsewhere. 
Planned Development and Public Administration 
18„ The dire effects of maladministration are likely to be great in 
almost every- field in which government operates in low-income countries.. 
It would be easy to justify widespread administrative reform in these 
governments on the basis of need. But given the scarcity of human skills 
and financial availabilities, it makes economic sense to allocate resources 
in a way which promisee the highest yields q u i c k l y , taking into account, 
what is politically and administratively feasible. In recent years, planned 
development has assumed well-nigh unchal lenged ascendancy as a national 
objective in most low-income countries. Since most public savings, as well 
as external aid and loans, are invested for development, improvements in 
public administration for development could greatly increase the speed and 
efficiency of investment efforts, the private as well as the public sector 
19. Because of this, many practitioners in the field of public admin-
istration have sought to make a major shift in the emphasis of their subject 
toward the requirements of planned development. Some have even advocated 
and introduced a new name, "Development Administration", either as a substi-
tute for, or as a branch of, public administration. Whatever the virtues of 
the name in emphasizing the new dimensions which planned development has 
added to public administration, it provides little guidance for dealing more 
12 ° 
effectively with the problems and inadequacies of public administration in 
low-income countries. For the fact is that the success of planned develop-
ment depends on the capacity of the administrative structure to implement 
development plans, programs and projects in virtually every sphere of 
1/ 
national activity,, -» If, therefore, points within the public administra-
tion are to be selected for partial improvement where global reform appears 
unfeasible, the question iss which points are most suitable for the purpose? 
If partial improvements are to lay a basis for future global reform, they 
must conform to the requirements of sound principles of public administratio. 
as well as to those of planned development«, 
20® But this is not easy to achieve., There is usually a lack of 
communication between planners and public administration experts«, Planners 
and public administration specialists are both keenly aware that ineffective 
administration seriously limits implementation of plans, but there is no 
meeting of minds about what should be done about it0 The practitioners in 
each field tend to adopt parochial views about their own specialties. 
21. Planners often do not grasp the importance of including as a part 
of their development plans a detailed and systematic set of measures for 
improving administrative procedures and building new institutional frameworks 
as necessary means for achieving plan targetSo They often consider their 
obligations fulfilled when they list administrative shortcomings in their 
plans and advise their removal. Their approach is generally prescriptive 
rather than evaluative, and almost never goes to the point of describing 
1/ U.N. ST/SG/AC.6/1.3, p. liO. 
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exactly how administrative shortcomings should be ameliorated oir eliminated, 
and who should have the responsibility for the task. 
22. Those in public administration also tend to go their own way. 
Few are development-minded or adequately informed about substantive problems 
of development® They sometimes think of public administration as a separate 
matter - something in and of itself. Reports by public administration 
experts, with their urgent recommendations for revising public, administration 
from top to: bottom, have an unspecific eloquence with which it. is hard: to 
find, fault, but which often seems wide of requirements for development. 
2J. Clearly, new initiatives are. required to bring planned development 
and public administration together. It is not a problem of exhorting one or 
the other group of practitioners to cooperate with the other; it. is late, if 
not too late, for that after, their respective periods of training are over. 
Rather, it seems essential that training programs in development planning 
include courses of instruction in public administration, and that training 
programs in public administration include courses of instruction in the sub-
stantive problems of development. There is also need to revise or replace 
principles of public administration made obsolete by the necessities of 
development. What may be good for developed nations, may not be applicable, 
at least without major adaptation, to less developed nations. General theo-
retical principles taught in universities must be supplemented, and tested, 
by case studies grounded on field experience in developing countries. This 
type of training will make it clear to planners and public administration 
,1/ Waterston, Albert, Development Flaiming: Lessons of Experience, pp. 283-lw 
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specialists alike that planning and administrative reform not only must be 
directed to the same ends, but must be carried on side by side in the con-
tinuous process that is planned development0 
- l u -
ll. APPLICATIONS 
The Planning Record 
Experience shows that a great deal can be accomplished when 
partial structural-functional improvements in administrative procedures 
and organization are purposively fitted to requirements of planned 
development. The considerable potentialities of this approach have now 
become apparent after a series of visits which the writer recently made 
to about a dozen countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America in his 
capacity as Adviser for Harming Organization in the World Bank. Almost 
all the countries visited have been or are committed to planned develop-
ment through the use of conventional, aggregative development plans with 
periods ranging from four to ten years. With few exceptions, the 
countries concerned have failed to achieve the targets in their develops 
ment plans. Indeed in several of the countries, development plans have 
been abandoned before their period has terminated because they were 
deemed to be beyond hope of fulfillment. 
2$. Studies completed in the World Bank have revealed that many, 
if not most, low-income countries in eariy stages of development are. 
unable to plan their overall development with reasonable accuracy for 
periods of much more than a year. The same studies have also provided 
1 
evidence that growth and development are not so much dependent on 
elegantly-integrated, aggregative plans as they are on the ability of 
governments to prepare and execute soundly-conceived projects in the 
public sector, control the allocations and expenditures of financial 
resources for these projects with reasonable efficiency through the 
budgets, and allow reasonable economic incentives to operate so as to, 
stimulate investment in the private sector. 
» is -
26. But in most low-income countries, there are serious 
deficiencies in one or more of these areas. Because of this, there is 
almost always a wide gap between what is called for, on the one hand, 
in medium-term, aggregative plans prepared by a central planning agency 
and, on the other hand, what goes on in operating ministries, depart-
ments and agencies, and in the budget office. 
A Pragmatic Planning Approach 
27. To bridge the gap which frequently exists between medium-term, 
aggregative plans, on the one hand, and projects, budgeting and economic 
policy, on the other hand, the writer advised governments in the coun-
tries he visited, to adopt a pragmatic approach to planning which 
comprises two main elements; 
a. Annual, aggregative planning tied to budgets, which 
focuses attention of decision-makers on what needs 
to be done immediately for development of the public 
and private sectors? and 
b. multiannual programming of strategic sectors of the 
economy which focuses attention on basic long-term 
policies and the systematic accumulation of a shelf 
of bankable projects for each sector. 
28. It would be going too far afield to present the rationale 
for this approach to planned development. Suffice it to say, that it 
requires, firstly, a reorientation of planning procedures and organiza-
tion in existing central planning agencies? secondly, the institution of 
a systematic and close relationship between plans and budgets? and 
- 16 -• 
thirdly, the establishment of machinery for sector programming an'd 
project preparation in operating ministries, departments and agencies. 
29. Since the planning system outlined above represents a con-
siderable departure from the conventional one, the ideal approach would 
have been to overhaul all major administrative procedures and the 
organizational -structure to conform to the new system. But given the 
circumstances in the countries visited, the -chances of achieving ̂najor 
adrainistmttefe changes were considered small, despite the willingness 
of most ¿governments concerned to adopt the new system. 
30. A more modest approach was therefore adopted which was more 
in line with the political realities and power relationships within ithe 
governments concerned, as well as within what was believed to be the 
limits of administrative capacity. In -fact, -taking -a leaf ffrom medicine., 
where conservative practice dictates the administration of only .the 
minimum dose of «a drug required to produce a cure, the writer .chose1to 
eschew the temptation to propose more than minimal changes in adminis-
tration required to insure reasonably effective operation of the new 
planning system. Consensus of those who would be most involved in 
carrying out the reforms was considered of much greater importance than 
maintenance of the purity of a principle, except for the very few 
principles with which compromise was impossible without jeopardizing 
the entire planning system. 
Ite-Organizing the Central Planning Agency 
31. The setting up of an appropriate organizational form within 
central planning agencies to permit it to prepare the annual plans 
- 17 -• 
Which constituted one of the two important elements in the new planning 
system, as outlined in paragraph 27, proved to be a relatively simple 
task, "ilthout exception, each central planning agency had an overall 
shortage of well-trained and experienced planning technicians. The 
shortage was often exacerbated by the way in which the technicians were 
distributed in the various units set up by the agency's organization 
chart. As a general matter, these organization charts followed a 
familiar arrangement of units along functional and sectoral lines. 
Some units were well-staffed or even over-staffedj most were not. In 
some units, only low-level jobs had been filled and existing personnel 
were inadequately supervised; in others, only a head constituted the 
entire staff and, because of the lack of assistants, he had to do cleri-
cal as well as analytical work. Thus, over-staffing and under-staffing 
of units existed side by side although, taken as a whole, central 
planning agencies almost always had fewer planners than they needed. 
32. To make the most effective use of the available staff for 
annual planning, a two-pronged approach was adopted. Firstly, wherever 
possible, central planning agencies were advised to contract out or 
otherwise farm out planning tasks, especially long-term studies, which 
could be done elsewhere. For example, in Ghana, it was found possible 
to have the Economics Department of the University of Ghana conduct 
some manpower, economic criteria and other studies for the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. In other countries, possibilities existed for farming 
out work on national income to the central bank or to research 
or gani zations. 
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33. Secondly, central planning organizations were advised 
employ a technique for deploying their manpower which has been used 
with excellent results in other countries which were short of planning 
technicians. In these countries, it has been found convenient to set 
up a small number of task forces, each with a work program arranged 
according to priorities. While each country has its peculiar require-
ments, it -was .generally found useful to recommend the establishment -of 
three task Somas "which would be concerned with the following jnsUlLenjs* 
Resources 
Seal resources (e.g., manpower, natural resources)j 
finance (fiscal matters, savings, investment, credits, 
foreign exchange, balance of payments, foreign aid 
•and assistance, debts, iet.c.3,. 
b. Co-ordination 
Co-ordination of sectoral programs, regional planning, 
preparation and revision of national plans, co-ordinating 
annual plans with budgets, etc. 
c- Implementation 
Progress reporting^ recommending credit, monetary, 
fiscal and other economic policies required to imple-
ment plans in agriculture and industry, etc.; setting 
criteria and standards for project implementation; 
organizational, administrative and procedural measures 
for the public and private sectors; technical assistance 
co-iordination; etc. 
~ 19 -
3U° It was recommended that available Staff be assigned to each 
task force in accordance with their respective functions and work loao. 
From time to times as required, the work loads and task forces would be 
reviewed and revised and staff reassigned to rtieet the new circumstances. 
By shifting planners from one task force to another, planning technicians 
v»!ould receive training in a broad range oi° subjects which would add to 
their knowledge and make them valuable in more than one planning 
specialty. Each task force would be headed by the best available person 
for the job in the central planning agency. Foreign advisers would be 
assigned to the heads of each task force. The heads of the task forces 
would constitute the membership of an Internal Co-ordinating Committee 
chaired by the head of the central planning agency. They would meet 
regularly or as required to co-ordinate task force activities and to 
review work programs, staff assignments, and so forth. The task force 
approach was suggested not only because it mobilizes available personnel 
for more concentrated effort on priority tasks than is possible when 
the staff is dispersed in small groups over a large number of organiza-
tional units| it also has the virtue of maintaining the flexible admin-
istrative arrangements essential to the changing environment character-
istic of developing countries. 
The Relation Between Plans and Budgets 
35» Unless the budget reflects the corresponding items in an 
annual plan, the probabilities are that the public sector portion of 
the plan will not be implemented. To insure the close relationships 
between plan and budget which is essential for effective plan imple-
mentation, requires a budget classification system and budgetary 
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procedures which permit easy translation of the plan into budgetary 
terms, as well as budgetary expenditure controls which allow timely and 
accurate preparation of quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports of 
plan progress. 
36. But in many less developed countries classification systems 
in budgets make it difficult to relate projects and programs in annual 
plans with, budgetary allocations . Good planning also requires that, 
recurrent expenditures, e. g., for training personnel, be related 
and phased with, capital outlays for construction of a project so that-
all parts of a development project move forward at appropriate speeds. 
In addition, it is useful in planning to be able to extract from the 
recurrent side of a budget development items which, when added to 
capital items for development, constitute, a comprehensive statement of 
budgetary outlays for development. But in many countries it is impos-
sible to do these things. 
37. Another impediment to effective planning relates to the way 
in which development and recurrent budgetary estimates are prepared in 
many countries. The development estimates are generally prepared in 
the central planning agenpy, while the recurrent estimates are prepared 
in the ministry of finance. There is often an inadequate system for 
insuring regular and early communication between the central planning 
office and the ministry of finance while each is preparing its esti-
mates, with the result that neither may be aware of the details of the 
estimates the other is preparing until after they have been completed. 
In one Asian country, capital estimates are prepared after the recurrent 
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estimates» These procedures no-: only do not allow proper phasing of 
capital estimates and recurrent estimates for development j they make it 
• i 
difficult to r.ieasure the impact of current investment outlays on future 
recurrent expenditures. This is a serious shortcoming, since capital 
expenditures almost always increase future recurrent expenditures. 
Unless this is borne in mind, the rise in the recurrent budget can 
gre&tl^ reduce the surplus on current account available for development. 
A final shortcoming of the system employed in many countries, is that 
operating ministries are required to make two budgetary presentations, 
one for capital estimates to the central planning agency, the other for 
recurrent estimates to the ministry of finance. 
38. Although serious, the problems outlined can be resolved with 
relatively simple administrative changes. To obtain a classification 
system which permits development expenditures, whether on recurrent or 
capital account, to be identified in budgets by projects and programs 
requires only a functional-economic cross-classification system. The 
preparation of such a classification system involves some problems, but 
they are surmountable if a committee composed of representatives of a 
country's central planning agency, the .ministry of finance and other 
interested bodies (e.g., representatives of autonomous public agencies) 
is set up with appropriate technical assistance to iron out problems. 
39. Ideally, the unity of the budget should not be endangered, 
as it is in practice in many countries, with one agency preparing 
capital and another preparing recurrent estimates. But a delicate 
problem confronts anyone who advises that the two parts of the budget 
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be prepared by one agency when two are engaged in the task. The adviser 
who recommends this may have principle on his side, but he is unlikely 
/ 
to convince one agency to relinquish its prerogatives to the other. 
Given the political and administrative realities in many countries, • 
another course generally has to be found for accomplishing the same 
I 
result. 
ho. Fortunately, a,simpler and proven method already exists^, and 
the countries; visited were advised to adopt, it, where there were ¿feal 
budgets. In Nigeria, and in some other countries, it has been, found1 
possible to deal effectively with the problems raised by dual budgets 
through a Budgetary Coordinating Committee. Top officials representing 
the budget office and the central planning agency act as permanent mem-
bers of the Coimnittee, and' a high official of each operating: mnistey, 
department or agency presenting budgetary proposals, acts as a temporary 
member when Ms; organization presents proposals for inclusion in the 
budget. Each operating organization presents its capital and recurrent 
estimates simultaneously. The estimates are considered and discussed 
by the Committee, which reconciles development and recurrent estimates 
and brings t,otal budget estimates, into line with available financial 
resources. Hie procedure outlined not only permits realistic estimates 
to be made of the impact of capital outlays on recurrent expenditures, 
but also reduces from two to one the number of budgetary presentations 
which operating organizations have to make. 
ill- There is general agreement that A central planning agency 
prepares overall plans and that operating ministries, departments and 
agencies prepare sector (or subsector) programs and projects in their 
respective fields of interest- Sometimes, central planning agencies 
take; over project and sector program preparation as a temporary eicpedient 
when operating ministries, departments and agencies are unable to carry 
out these tasks as efficiently or as quickly as planners wish. Experi-
ence shows that when a planning agency takes over work which properly 
belongs to operating organizations, friction almost invariably develops. 
Moreover, what starts as a temporary expedient, often ends up in a long-
term arrangement which is hard to change. When this happens, many 
operating organizations are virtually outside the sphere of planning, 
with pernicious results for planned development. 
hr2 o Under the proposed pragmatic system of planning advocated by 
the writer, central planning agencies were expected to prepare annual 
development plans, a task which involves a considerable amount of work 
in a variety of fields, and follow-up on plan implementation. It was 
therefore recommended that the central planning agencies not attempt to 
prepare sector programs and projects. These tasks are properly those 
of operating organizations, and it is they which must learn to carry 
them out effectively if a country is to make the most of its manpower 
for development» 
h3o But experience has shown that most ministries, departments 
and agencies do not know how to prepare soundly-conceived projects and 
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programs, carry them out according to a well-devised cost and tin» 
schedule, and operate (or maintain) them efficiently after completion. 
Experience has also demonstrated that the most effective way of getting 
personnel in operating, ministries, departments and agencies to perform 
these tasks properly is to establish programming units in these organi-
zations. The governments visited were accordingly advised to create 
such units, at least in the most important operating organizations or, 
where such- units had been established, to Make them more effective than 
they were. 
hli- Since programming units would constitute a vital link in 
tying projects and sector programs to annual plans and budgets, and in 
addition, would constitute a relatively new administrative concept for 
nany of the countries visited, much time was spent explaining; its 
nature, form, functions and procedures. The programming unit was des-
cribed as the virtual equivalent for its organization of a central 
planning agency for a national government. Its functions were defined 
to include (a) the setting of standards and criteria for operating: 
departments or other units to follow in preparing and carrying out 
projectsj (b) the formulation of the overall development program and 
the recurrent budget for its organization, on the basis of directives 
from the organization's head; (c) the preparation of alternative devel-
opment policies for the consideration of the organization's head,1 after 
consultation with the various operating heads of departments or other 
units; (d) the setting of standards for operating departments and units 
to follow in reporting on the progress of projects and, on the basis bf 
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reports from operating units, the preparation of regular, timely and 
reasonably complete reports and evaluations of its organization's over-
all program; (e) the coordination of the technical assistance program 
for its organization! and (f) liaison for its organization with the 
central planning agency. 
IS» In order to institutionalize liaison between programming 
units and the central planning agency, it was recommended that an i 
Inter-Ministry ELanning Committee be created with the heads of all pro-
gramming units as members and a high official of the central planning 
agency as chairman. It was suggested that a representative of the budget 
office be included as a member to assure that that office was kept in-
formed of the Committee's activities. The functions of the Committee 
were defined to include the formulation of uniform criteria and standards 
for preparing projects, sector programs and plans, and for reporting on 
their progress in consistent form. 
ii6. Experience has shown that programming units, to be successful, 
had to be located administratively at a high level. In the British-type 
government administration, this meant that the programming unit ought 
to be located immediately under the permanent secretary. In the French-
also 
type government administration, it/meant that the programming unit ought 
to be placed immediately below the highest permanent official in an 
organization. Indeed, if these officials were not as busy as they were 
with day-to-day tasks, they would have been the logical heads of the 
programming units in- their organizations. But given the prevailing 
circumstances in the governments of the countries visited, it seemed 
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more practical to suggest that the head of each programming unit, fee? the 
second in rank in each operating organization. 
I4.7 o It was considered desirable that the head of each progranping 
unit outrank the operating heads of units within each organization be-
cause experience has shown that officials do not easily yield their 
prerogatives to, other officials of the same or lower rank. In the , 
countries visited which had established programming units, almost #1" 
were ineffectual because, in part, they hadi been placed at too low; a 
level in- their organizations; in part, because they had been assigned; 
duties extraneous to programming; and in part, because there was little 
understanding of the special staffing requirements of programming units. 
1|8. Thus, no special efforts had been made to find suitably 
trained or experienced persons for the programming units. It was not 
understood that programming in an operating ministry, like planning in 
a central planning agency, is a highly specialized field which generally 
requires technicians like engineers, agronomists, etc., who have mastered 
enough economics and accounting to make cost-benefit analyses for proj-
j 
eets and to evaluate projects economically for the purpose of combining 
them into sound sector and subsector programs on the basis of general 
economic and other criteria. Of course, even less thought had been 
given to staffing requirements for programming units in countries which 
had none. 
1*9. In dealing with staffing requirements, the writer advised 
that persons, assigned to programming units receive special training in 
sector programming and project preparation; and that since they would 
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then constitute a scarce resources they should then be allowed to remain 
for long periods in programming units or, interchangeably, in the central 
planning agency or the budget office. At the same time, it was recog-
nized that it would be desirable to have regular civil servants rotate 
in and out of programming units, to bring to these units their varied 
experience and to diffuse planning and programming "know-how" throughout 
the public service when they transferred to other operating posts after 
a period of service in programming units, the central planning agency 
or the budget office. 
E>0. To meet these apparently conflicting requirements, it was 
recommended that a new Planning (or Economic) Service, with ranks and 
perquisites equal to those of the regular, civil service, be created. 
Qualified personnel transferred from technical or administrative services, 
or individuals entering the Flanning Service from outside, would consti-
tute the hard core of the staffs in programming units, the central 
planning agency and the budget office. Members of the Planning Service 
would be posted to a position in any of these three areas for long 
periods. They would be transferred "laterally", from one programming 
unit to another, or to and from the central planning agency and the 
budget office. Regular civil servants could then move in and out of 
programming units, the central planning agency and the budget office, 
from or to "non-planning", "non-programming" or "aon=budgeting" posts 
in the usual way. In this way, the Planning Service and the regular 
civil service could together provide the continuity required in pro-
gramming units, the central planning agency and the budget office without 
sacrificing the time-proven flexibility in the prevailing civil service 
system® 
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51o Since experience throughout the world had demonstratedIthat 
the establishment of viable programming units required specialized out-
side technical assistance which could concentrate on the task of creating 
the programming units, setting up appropriate procedures, and training 
staffs for the units, it was recommended that steps be taken to obtain 
suitable technical assistance for this {purpose. 
Implementation of the Recommendations 
52» jffo&b „of the countries .concerned '«are visited in 1966. 2t 
would therefore be premature in January 1967., when this is being written, 
to expect definitive results. However, the steps taken to implement 
recommendations ̂ have been encouraging. In some countries, only a "few 
recommendations are being implemented, but in more than half of the 
countries -visited, implementation of recommendations has meant that 
important changes in past administrative organization and procedures 
have been introduced. 
53» Maî y are adopting the system of annual comprehensive 
planning-euro-multiannual sectoral programming which was recommended 
(although some combine this with medium-term aggregative plans). In 
Thailand and Colombia, task forces were set up in central planning 
agencies to deploy personnel efficiently for planning; in Ceylon, 
Malaysia and Ghana, budgetary coordinating committees will consider 
recurrent and capital estimates simultaneously; in Ceylon, Ethiopia., 
Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia and Thailand, steps are being taken to i 
establish programming units in operating organizations; and in Ceylon 
and Ghana plans are being made to set up a special EL aiming Service 
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alongside the regular civil service administrations. One major 
difficulty has been encountered? an unusual scarcity of foreign tech-
nical assistance for sectoral programming and project preparation. 
Consideration is now being given to dealing with this problem, but it 
is apparent that until a solution can be found, viable programming units 
cannot be widely established soon in low-income countries. But taken 
as a whole, it seems fair to say that the outlook for carefully-considered 
partial adninistrative betterment, when tied to planned development inno-
vations, is good. 
;f 
j 
Addendum to the paper. 
"Public Administration for What? 
- A Pragmatic View -
The more than three years which have elapsed since preparation of 
the paper, "Public Administration for What? - A Pragmatic View" have 
provided the time needed to evaluate the applicability of the proposals 
in the paper to developing countries. Since the paper was written, many 
developing countries have awakened to the importance of sector programming 
as a bridge between projects and national development plans. Many countries 
have also begun to give increased emphasis to annual planning, either as a 
means of making medium-term plans operational by tying them more closely to 
government budgets, or as a substitute for medium-term plans when (for 
reasons of political instability, economic uncertainty, administrative 
friction, or the inability to arrive at a national consensus on development 
objectives) it seems unlikely that multi-annual plans can be implemented. 
These changes have had repercussions in organization and administration 
In particular, many countries are now spending much more time than before in 
establishing programming units, or in strengthening them where they exist. 
In addition, more attention is being given to improvement of budgetary 
organization, administration and procedures for linking annual plans with 
budgets; relating investment and recurrent budgets; controlling expenditures 
and reporting on the progress of project and program execution. 
In attempting to institutionalize the system of annual planning 
closely linked to budgets cum sector programming described in the paper, 
I found that it was fruitless only to diagnose the problem and prescribe 
improvement, even when government officials appeared to be sincere in the 
readiness to adopt the prescription. Nor did it prove to be sufficient to 
detail the administrative and procedural reforms required to implement the 
recpmmendations made, or even to itemize the technical assistance needed 
to carry out the recommendations, 
/IY§r experience 
experience has made it clear that in addition to detailing, 
procedures required to carry out recommendations, it is essential to 
provide assistance which can help get reforms started. For example, in 
three countries where the government accepted virtually all the 
recommendations made, officials did not know how to deal effectively 
with the heads of the new programming units which had been established 
at my recommendation. An this was true despite detailed descriptions 
spelled out in the reports presented to each Government. 
Until I returned to each country and assisted officials in organizing 
the first meetings of the programming unit heads into a coordination 
committee, helped prepare agenda for the meetings and laid out work programs 
for the programming units, etc., officials appeared to be at a loss about 
exactly how to proceed. ffi|y experience has convinced me that this kind of 
initial assistance from the one who prescribes reforms is of critical 
importance for institutionalizing reforms. 
In conclusion, it may be worth-while to summarize briefly the five 
steps I found it necessary to take to make my recommendations operational. 
I believe they are applicable to other aspects of public administrative 
reform: 
A. Diagnose the planning and programming situation in each country, 
describing the main bottle-necks and problems. (This often involved 
exposing the extent to which plan formulation was largely divorced from 
plan implementation.) 
B. Prescribe the improvements to be made to correct the problems 
disclosed in the diagnosis. (This usually involved proposals for giving 
greater emphasis to annual planning, improved budgeting and sector 
programming.) 
C. Describe in detail the administrative and procedural changes required 
to carry out the prescribed recommendations. (in general, I proposed 
only minimal changes in structure and procedure required to insure reasonably 
effective operation of the improved planning approach recommended. I also 
sought to adapt my proposals to the political realities, power relationships, 
civil service customs and other traditions within each country, as well as 
/to each 
to each government's administrative capacity. This approach turned out 
to be more effective than the "wholistic" approach commonly advocated by 
public administration experts, a conclusion I come to because I encountered 
virtually no opposition from vested interests to the changes in planning 
machinery proposed, 
D. Prepare a program of technical assistance required to improve overall 
planning (whether medium-term or annual, as required), start or advance 
sector programming (including the setting up of programming units in 
technical ministries, departments and agencies), and improve budgeting 
(for this, a phased program of betterment is the most practical approach. 
The technical assistance programs included job descriptions and listed the 
qualifications of the technicians required. With technical assistance 
authorities in the country concerned, I approached prospective national and 
international donors and gave support to the country requests for technical 
assistance try explaining the program of planning improvement and the specific 
part which the technicians requested of the donor would play in carrying out 
the program as a whole), 
E, Finally, I helped start the proposed innovations in planning, 
sometimes by returning to the country one or two times for this purpose, 
(To help make my recommendations operational, I worked with officials to 
set up first meetings of new bodies (e.g., Inter-Ministerial Programming 
Coordination Committees, Budget Review Committees, Agricultural Councils); 
held briefing sessions with officials appointed to head programming units 
in technical ministries; gave talks to top officials to explain the 
planning process and their role in implementing plans and projects; visited 
every important ministry, department or agency to discuss it3 own planning 
or programming problems; met with central planning agency personal to 
improve their planning work; etc.). 
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